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Abstract
We build a cumulative innovation model in which both success and fail-
ure provide valuable information for future research. To test this learn-
ing mechanism, we use a dataset covering outcomes of world-wide R&D
projects in the pharmaceutical industry, and proxy knowledge flows with
forward citations received by patents associated with each project. Em-
pirical results confirm theoretical predictions that patents associated with
successfully completed projects (i.e., leading to drug launch on the market)
receive more citations than those associated to failed (terminated) projects,
which in turn are cited more often than patents lacking clinical or preclinical
information. We therefore offer evidence of the value of failures as research
inputs in (pharmaceutical) innovation.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is a cumulative process (Scotchmer, 2004), where researchers learn
from past results and adjust their behaviour on the basis of previous experience
(Herriot et al., 1985, Cyert and March, 1992). Successes (e.g., successful achieve-
ment of some milestones, or an invention) are widely recognized to be the corner-
stones of scientific and technological progress. Inventors tend to privilege learning
from successes, also driven by the strong emphasis on positive outcomes in sci-
entific journals and the business press (Denrell, 2003). However, theoretical and
empirical contributions highlight the essential role of failures in learning, even
though individuals and organizations do not always openly share knowledge about
their mistakes (Levitt and March, 1988, Levinthal and March, 1993, Desai, 2010).
In addition to its own experience, a research organization can learn by vicariously
observing other players in the same field, in particular others’ failures (Teerlak and
Gong, 2008, Francis and Zheng, 2010). Empirical works have provided evidence
of the benefit of learning from failures via both direct and vicarious experiences
and feedbacks (Ingram and Baum, 1997, Haunschild and Miner, 1997, Baum and
Ingram, 1998, Chuang and Baum, 2003, Baum and Dahlin, 2007, Kim and Miner,
2007, Madsen, 2009, Madsen and Desai, 2010, Francis and Zheng, 2010).
Against this background, in this paper we analyse the learning process in the
pharmaceutical industry, exploring how firms build on own and others’ failures and
successes. The pharmaceutical industry is a domain characterized by high develop-
ment costs, radical uncertainty and delayed feedbacks. Failures to let compounds
advance in clinical trials entail large losses: pre-approval costs per approved drug
have been recently estimated to be over 1 billion US dollars (DiMasi et al., 2003,
Adams and Brantner, 2006, Paul et al., 2010). The growing number of R&D fail-
ures is one of the main causes of the upsurge of the estimated R&D costs per new
molecular entity, leading scholars to ask whether the pharmaceutical industry is
now facing an R&D productivity crisis (Cockburn, 2006, Pammolli et al., 2011).
In this paper we study to which extent firms learn from past failures and
successes in pharmaceutical R&D. We show that the learning process in pharma-
ceuticals builds both on R&D successes and failures, analogously to the economic
value of findings and non-findings spanning from basic research (David et al.,
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1992). However, since open science is strongly biased toward the publication of
positive results, patents and clinical trials play a fundamental role in pharmaceu-
ticals to disclose R&D failures information (Pammolli and Rossi, 2005, Magazzini
et al., 2009).1 Under conditions of uncertainty, patent disclosure may contribute
to generate knowledge spillovers, promoting multiple parallel research efforts on
plausible targets and stimulating private investment and competition. Moreover,
we maintain that the disclosure of failed drug development attempts should be fur-
ther enhanced by providing full access to the information concerning discontinued
clinical trials.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we outline a simple model
of pharmaceutical R&D. We consider the case of multiple candidate approaches,
as emphasized by recent economic theory of innovation (e.g., Aghion et al., 2008).
We assume that, among several approaches, at most one is the right approach
that can lead to a final invention (i.e., a marketable drug). In this environment, a
piece of “positive” information that raises the success likelihood of one approach
will simultaneously reduce that of the other approaches. Similarly, “negative”
information, e.g., when a research project based on some approach fails, will reduce
the success probability of the experimented approach, and at the same time raise
the prospects of other approaches. In a simple way, this captures the idea that
both success and failure convey useful information for subsequent innovation.
In section 3 we exploit a comprehensive dataset which covers innovative ac-
tivities of world-wide pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms as well as public
research organizations.2 The dataset covers more than 200,000 patents in the
pharmaceutical field, and provides history records about more than 22,000 drug
development projects. Exploiting this information, we link each compound that
entered preclinical or clinical development to its patent(s). For every investiga-
tional drug our database reports detailed information of development history, from
patent application to project termination (when and at which stage) or market-
ing. This provides us with a unique opportunity to trace an R&D project from
patent filing to clinical development outcome. According to the outcome of asso-
1More in general, dedicated incentive schemes such as a “market for R&D failures” (Shalem
and Trajtenberg, 2009) has been put forward to enhance the transmission of the information
regarding failures among competitors.
2This dataset is maintained at IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy.
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ciated R&D projects, we classify patents into three categories. A patent is called
(i) a success, when it is matched to a R&D project which leads to a drug being
marketed, (ii) a failure, when the associated R&D project is terminated during
preclinical or clinical trials (due to, for instance, toxicological effects or lack of
effectiveness), and (iii) inconclusive (or no information), when we have no infor-
mation about entry into clinical trials. We emphasize that, by a “successful” or
“failed” patent, we do not mean that the patent itself is a success or failure. A
patent is granted for its technological or scientific contribution, and thus represents
some “success” in advancing knowledge. These modifiers refer to the subsequent
experimental outcome of R&D projects associated with the patent. Since all new
drug candidates are patented well before entering into clinical trials and all com-
panies must successfully pass through clinical trials to launch innovative drugs,
the pharmaceutical industry provides an ideal setting to investigate the value of
failed R&D attempts.
Following the literature, we use the forward citation a patent receives from
other research entities to measure knowledge flows, and compare the citation num-
bers of success, failure, and uninformative projects. A higher citation number im-
plies a broader dissemination of knowledge contained in the patent (Trajtenberg,
1990, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999, Harhoff et al., 1999, Jaffe et al., 2000, Tra-
jtenberg et al., 1997, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). We find that successful patents
do receive more citations than failed ones, which in turn are cited more often than
inconclusive ones. Consistent with our theory, there is learning from both success
and failure. In addition, we also find that learning from success persists longer –
that is, knowledge generated from failure decays faster than that from success.
Section 4 discusses our main findings and provides some conclusions.
2 Learning in Pharmaceutical R&D
The pharmaceutical industry is a textbook example of a “science-based” sector
(Pavitt, 1984, Orsenigo et al., 2001). Scientific progress and drug development
are deeply intertwined: innovations of both new therapeutic products and im-
provements of existing ones (in terms of better delivery, reduced side-effects, or
improved efficacy) are driven by new discoveries in bacterial, animal, and human
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processes by scientific communities. As Science advances, firms dissect and analyse
an increasing number of research methods and R&D trajectories (Orsenigo et al.,
2001). Furthermore, biopharmaceutical firms are also involved in basic research,
with important effects on research productivity (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998).
We therefore consider scientific research in this field as a cumulative process
which consists of a series of experiments to discover the “right” or successful ap-
proach for product development (e.g., drugs). Within each technology space, such
as a disease area, J > 1 alternative candidate approaches or trajectories coexist
(e.g. different research hypothesis on biological targets and chemically related fam-
ilies of compounds).3 For the sake of simplicity we consider the case in which at
most one approach can lead to success (e.g., a treatment for a medical condition),
and it is possible that no approaches succeed. However, our results hold also in
the case in which more than one approach can be successful. The true state of
nature is described by which approach, if any, is the successful one.
Three outcomes may arise for each approach j, τ j ∈ {s, f, n}. A result τ j = s
indicates “success,” namely, positive evidence of the tested approach; τ j = f and
n represent “failure” (negative evidence) and “no result,” respectively.4 With
probability β, the experimental result coincides with the true state: the outcome
is a good sign τ j = s if approach j succeeds, and a bad sign τ j = f if it fails.
With probability γ, no useful result is generated: the occurrence of the sign τ j = n
does not depend on the true state. And, with the remaining probability 1−β−γ,
the experiment delivers the wrong result. We impose the following assumption, so
that a result τ j ∈ {s, f} remains informative.
Assumption 1. (Informative experiments) β > 1− β − γ > 0.
3Sutton (2001) takes a similar approach to analyse the R&D competition in pharmaceuticals
by considering different chemically related families as independent R&D trajectories.
4A success validates an approach and a new drug is launched in the market. However, other
drugs can follow if they demonstrate in clinical trials to be more effective than the best available
treatment. In the cancer field, chemiotherapic agents such as camptothecin (CPT), were first
discovered in the Sixties. However drug development of CPT was early discontinued due to severe
side effects. New attention was raised over the compound in 1985 when researchers discovered
that DNA topoisomerase I is the molecular target of CPT. However, the lactone ring of CPT,
necessary for a proper fit into the active site of Topo I exhibit very unstable properties. Following
this discovery different approaches have been considered to find more stable and soluble CPT
analogues and a set of more effective products has been launched.
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A lower γ raises the likelihood that the experiment delivers some outcome
(success or failure), and a higher β ensures that this outcome provides more infor-
mation, that is, it is more aligned with the true state of nature. These parameters
capture the “quality” of the experiment and determine how informative its out-
come is.5
After t experiments have been conducted, let {αˆjt}j=1,2,...,J be the profile of the
success probability of each approach, with 0 ≤
∑J
j=1 αˆ
j
t ≤ 1, due to the mutually
exclusive success of each approach. Let us assume that the t + 1th experiment is
run on approach j. We use Bayes’ rule to update success probabilities according
to the new experiment outcome.
Experiment t+1 delivers a positive sign for approach j, τ jt+1 = s, with probabil-
ity αˆjtβ+(1−αˆ
j
t )(1−β−γ). With probability αˆ
j
t , this approach is the successful one
and the experiment gives the right outcome with probability β. With probability
1− αˆjt , approach j cannot lead to success but the experiment mistakenly delivers
the opposite result, with probability 1− β − γ. The updated success probabilities
are
αˆ
j
t+1 =
αˆ
j
tβ
αˆ
j
tβ + (1− αˆ
j
t )(1− β − γ)
> αˆ
j
t (1)
for approach j, and
αˆkt+1 =
αˆkt (1− β − γ)
αˆ
j
tβ + (1− αˆ
j
t )(1− β − γ)
< αˆkt (2)
for all other approaches k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J}, k 6= j. Similarly, the experiment gives
a negative result, τ jt+1 = f , with probability αˆ
j
t (1 − β − γ) + (1 − αˆ
j
t )β, and the
5This type of research is “applied” in the sense that the experiment is conducted only on
one approach, despite its informational externality to be shown below. Instead, “basic” or
“fundamental” research may be viewed as experiments delivering direct results about several
approaches. This distinction between basic and applied research stresses not the timing of
invention, but the contribution to the knowledge accumulation process. Another type of research
is that of research tools, which may be modeled as an invention which increases the precision of
applied research, i.e., a better research tool increases β.
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updated probabilities are
αˆ
j
t+1 =
αˆ
j
t (1− β − γ)
αˆ
j
t (1− β − γ) + (1− αˆ
j
t )β
< αˆ
j
t (3)
for approach j, and
αˆkt+1 =
αˆkt β
αˆ
j
t (1− β − γ) + (1− αˆ
j
t )β
> αˆkt (4)
for other approaches. Lastly, the experiment generates an uninformative outcome,
τ
j
t+1 = n, with probability αˆ
j
tγ + (1− αˆ
j
t )γ = γ, and assessment of success proba-
bility remains unchanged:
αˆ
j
t+1 =
αˆ
j
tγ
αˆ
j
tγ + (1− αˆ
j
t )γ
= αˆjt , αˆ
k
t+1 =
αˆkt γ
αˆ
j
tγ + (1− αˆ
j
t )γ
= αˆkt . (5)
By mutual exclusivity, a positive outcome for one approach “crowds out” the
prospects of other approaches. More interestingly, a failed experiment reduces the
success probability of that approach (and of the whole field), but at the same
time it increases the probability that the successful route may be concealed in
other approaches. In other words, both successful and failed experiments are
informative.
To test this insight empirically, we use forward citations to assess the knowledge
contribution of a patented technology. We consider a very simple R&D decision
and patent citation generation process.6 Once a new approach is pursued (i.e. a
new patent is applied for claiming the new trajectory), let us assume that all the
previous patents in the same fields are cited, i.e., there is no strategic citation.7
6Strategic interactions at both the final market and R&D competition stages can be intro-
duced to enrich the model, but as a first step, we leave these concerns aside in order to focus on
the learning mechanism described above.
7The importance of pharmaceutical patents as an incentive to innovation is unquestionable.
Survey evidence on the nature and the strength of appropriability conditions in the US and
Europe show that the biopharmaceutical industry is the one where patents received the highest
score as an effective mechanism for protecting intellectual property rights as well as the one
with the highest propensity to patent (Cohen et al., 2000, Arundel and Kabla, 1998). As a
result, when analyzing the pharmaceutical industry, patents can be considered a good proxy for
innovations.
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The number of forward citations a patent receives is thus positively correlated
with subsequent inventors’ incentives to enter the field. Denote αˆ∗t ≡ max{αˆ
j
t}
as the highest success probability in the field after t experiments, and let the
corresponding approach be j∗. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that a firm’s
incentive to enter and start a research project increases in probability αˆ∗t . Post-
entry, the firm, with knowledge {αˆjt}, conducts experiments on the most promising
approach j∗. In sum, these assumptions imply that a patent will receive more
forward citations if its outcome raises the highest success probability in the field
by a larger magnitude.
We now derive our hypothesis. First, consider the firm’s experiment on ap-
proach j∗. An uninformative result (τ j
∗
t+1 = n) does not change the knowledge
stock or the entry incentives, {αˆjt+1} = {αˆ
j
t}. But a positive sign (τ
j∗
t+1 = s)
raises the highest success probability. A positive experimental result maintains
the status of j∗ as the most promising approach, and raises its success probability,
αˆ
j∗
t+1 > αˆ
j∗
t . Therefore, a patent associated with a successful experiment should
receive more forward citations than one with no informative outcome.
If the experiment outcome is negative, (τ j
∗
t+1 = f), then the success probability
of approach j∗ becomes lower. But the information brought by a failed experiment
may sufficiently boost the success probability of other approaches, so that, after
incorporating the new information, the highest success probability in the field is
larger than αˆj
∗
t . That is, there may exist k 6= j
∗ so that:
αˆkt+1 =
αˆkt β
αˆ
j∗
t (1− β − γ) + (1− αˆ
j∗
t )β
> αˆ
j∗
t ⇔ β
(
αˆ
j∗
t −
αˆ
j∗
t − αˆ
k
t
αˆ
j∗
t
)
> (1− β − γ)αˆj
∗
t .
(6)
When this condition holds, a patent associated with a failed outcome will also
receive more forward citations than one with uninformative outcomes.8 In gen-
eral, this condition requires the difference in success probability between the most
promising and the second most promising approach to be not too large. For in-
stance, if at the initial state, i.e., before any experiments are run, the prior belief
8If we assume that patents with informative outcomes receive more forward citations than
those with uninformative outcomes, then this relationship holds directly from the information
spillover of failed experiments.
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is characterized by uniform distribution, αˆj0 is the same for all j, then the condi-
tion holds for the first experiment. Alternatively, under the assumption of uniform
prior, if all past experiments are failures and there is still some “untested” approach
k, then the success probability of approach k is the same as αˆj
∗
t ; the condition also
holds.9 These two scenarios seem to fit the pharmaceutical context well, where
most patents either have no informative results in their backward citations, or only
cite past failures. In our data, the vast majority of patents (80.34%) do not con-
tain any informative outcomes in their backward citations. By summing patents
that cite only uninformative or negative results, we obtain that 88.12% of total
pharmaceutical patents cite no successful patent.
Second, we compare positive and negative experimental outcomes. Fixing αˆj
∗
t ,
compare the highest success probability after an experiment is conducted on ap-
proach j∗. For k 6= j∗,
αˆ
j∗
t β
αˆ
j∗
t β + (1− αˆ
j∗
t )(1− β − γ)
>
αˆkt β
αˆ
j∗
t (1− β − γ) + (1− αˆ
j∗
t )β
(7)
⇔ αˆj
∗
t [(1− αˆ
j∗
t )− αˆ
k
t ]β > [αˆ
k
t (1− αˆ
j∗
t )− αˆ
j∗2
t ](1− β − γ), (8)
because β > 1− β − γ, and because
αˆ
j∗
t [(1− αˆ
j∗
t )− αˆ
k
t ] > αˆ
k
t (1− αˆ
j∗
t )− αˆ
j∗2
t ⇔ αˆ
j∗
t > αˆ
k
t , (9)
where αˆj
∗
t + αˆ
k
t ≤ 1. A positive result must raise the highest success probability by
a larger amount than a negative result, and so must receive more forward citations.
Note that this is robust to the history of research, as summarized in {αˆjt}.
To summarize, we test the hypothesis that a patent associated with a successful
project receives more citations than one associated with a failed project or a patent
whose project is inconclusive. When condition (6) holds, a patent corresponding
to a failed project also receives more forward citations than one corresponding to
a project which is inconclusive.
Lastly, note that we do not rule out the possibility that none of the candidate
approaches are correct. Therefore, if more and more failures are accumulated,
9As for assumption 1, β > 1−β−γ, condition (6) certainly holds if αˆj
∗
t −[(αˆ
j∗
t −αˆ
k
t )/αˆ
j∗
t ] = αˆ
j∗
t ,
i.e. when αˆj
∗
t = αˆ
k
t . More generally, it holds when the two probabilities are not too far apart.
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eventually an extra failed experiment only indicates that the whole research field
is an impasse. We may observe fewer entries, and thus fewer forward citations, for a
failed project as more knowledge is accumulated. This is in contrast with previous
works such as those of Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997), Haller and Pavlopoulos
(2002), Shalem and Trajtenberg (2009), in which one (and only one) right research
always exists, and failure in one approach always brings good news in the form of
narrowing the range of future exploration.
To help the reader thinking about the process we have in mind, consider, as
an example, the case of p38 mitogen-activating protein kinase, a serine-threonine
kinase that regulates the inflammatory processes.10 The biological target was first
exploited in two patents by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in the early 1980s. Since
then, various companies have entered the field and different approaches have been
considered. Some companies have patented compounds with structural homology
to the original GSK lead compound (that was discontinued in 1998 due to the
emergence of toxicological problems), and cited the GSK patent. Others have
explored alternative approaches based on the same target but chemically unrelated
families of drug candidates. After more than thirty years of research and multiple
failures no p38 inhibitor has been commercialized yet. As a result, despite the
patent covering the GSK leading compound has received several citations it has
been recently questioned whether this inhibitors have still to be considered as
viable therapeutic opportunities (Gaestel et al., 2009).
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data and measures
The Pharmaceutical Industry Database (PhID) maintained at IMT Institute for
Advanced Studies in Lucca (Italy) contains comprehensive information on innova-
tive activity within the pharmaceutical industry, including R&D project level data,
patents and their citations, and collaborations and sales data. It has two broad
categories of information, pharmaceutical patents and drug development projects.
10The example presented here are drawn from Magazzini et al. (2009). Please refer to the
original paper for additional details.
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The database covers all pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents granted by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (henceforth, USPTO) since 1965, with
information such as numbers of backward citations and forward citations (up to
May 2004), application dates, and names of assignees. It also includes worldwide
R&D projects for the past 30 years, with more than 22,000 drug development
projects in total. The database tracks the development history of each compound,
from patent application, preclinical and clinical trials, to final marketing. If a
research project (chemical compound) was aborted, information about when ter-
mination was announced is also reported.
Our empirical strategy is to compare the patterns of forward citation among
patents with different project outcomes. We focus on the pharmaceutical industry
and consider only citations from other pharmaceutical patents.11 We distinguish
self-citations from citations by other organizations. It is interesting to compare the
dynamics of the two groups as self-citations and citations by other organizations
are considered as characterizing of different patterns in knowledge diffusion. On
the one side, citations by other inventors have been proved to be good proxies
for knowledge flows in the literature (Jaffe et al., 2000). On the other side, self-
citations may measure factors other than learning, such as the cumulative nature
of the technology and the extent to which innovators are able to benefit by their
own research efforts (Hall et al., 2001).
To classify patents according to project outcomes, we exploit the information
provided by the dataset, where a patent search was conducted for each compound
and one or more relevant patents protecting the compound were identified.12 Since
our data source only provides citation information for US patents, we restrict
analysis to those projects that can be matched with US patents (either directly
or via the patent family). By doing this, we also avoid institutional factors, as
different patent offices may adopt different examination procedures which may
lead to different citation behaviors (Breschi and Lissoni, 2004, Michel and Bettles,
11We define pharmaceutical patents as those in classes A61K and A01N according to the
International Patent Classification (henceforth, IPC; see Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001)) and US
classes 424, 435, 514, and 800.
12The relationship between R&D projects and patents is one-to-many. When more than one
patent is associated with a project, we considered all associated patents (and replicated the
record accordingly). In our sample, each project is associated with an average of 1.1 US patents.
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2001).13 According to this criterion, we are able to identify the patent history of
49% of projects in the dataset.
We also select patents whose projects have successful outcomes (i.e., a new drug
was launched on the market) or failed ones (i.e., the project was aborted, due, for
instance, to the emergence of toxicological effects or to lack of effectiveness). We
refer to these patents as successful or failed patents, depending on the outcome
of the associated R&D projects. Overall, there are about 2,000 projects with
informative outcomes.
As a last step to construct the data for empirical analysis, we create a “reference
group,” i.e., those patents for which we have no information about preclinical
or clinical development. For each informative (successful or failed) patent, we
randomly match it with a patent from the pool of pharmaceutical patents with
the same application year, publication year, and IPC class, but with no information
about preclinical or clinical development, that is, the protected compound has not
yet entered preclinical or clinical trials.14 These are projects of “no results,” or
“uninformative results” in our theoretical model.
3.2 Methodology
We estimate and compare the lag distributions of forward citations (self-citations
and citations by other organizations) among different groups of patents, that is,
the frequency of citations received (citation intensity) across the time differences
between the granting years of citing and cited patents (citation lags).
The analysis of lag distributions aims at revealing some interesting dynamic
patterns of forward citations according to patent groups. We use the double-
exponential function to model the citation lag distributions of successful and failed
13We further excluded old compounds and/or natural products, which do not have any asso-
ciated patent.
14Our dataset contains all preclinical and clinical trial information in the United States and
major European countries. Some projects may have been misclassified as inconclusive because
their trials were conduced in other countries and not reported in the dataset. However, absent a
mutual recognition precedure, the Food and Drug Administration and the European Medicines
also consider the outcome of clinical trials conducted in third countries as inconclusive for drug
launches in the United States and Europe respectively. Thus, we are confident that this does not
significantly bias our result. If at all, it only works against our hypothesis that failed projects
provide more information than inconclusive ones.
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patents vis-a`-vis uninformative patents. This model provides a flexible framework
to study the process of citation generation: An exponential process to capture
knowledge diffusion is coupled with a second exponential process to capture knowl-
edge obsolescence (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996, Caballero and Jaffe, 1993). We
use the following specification as in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996):
p(t, T, τ) = δτ0 (t, T ) exp[−δ
τ
1 (T − t)](1− exp[−δ2(T − t)]), (10)
where τ ∈ {s, f, n} is the project outcome of the cited patent (s for success, f
for failure, n for uninformative outcome), t the granting year of the cited patent,
and T the granting year of the citing patent, with T > t. Therefore, p(t, T, τ) is
the likelihood that a patent granted in year T will cite a patent granted in year
t with outcome τ . Parameter δ·0 is related to the overall likelihood of being cited
(average citation intensity). Parameters δ·1 and δ2 capture the rates of knowledge
obsolescence (i.e., citations to patent granted in year t decrease and eventually
stop, as the patented innovation is replaced by new knowledge)15 and knowledge
diffusion, respectively. We assume that granting years T and t only affect average
citation intensity δ·0, and that the project outcome of cited patent τ affect both
δτ0 and the rate of obsolescence δ
τ
1 , but not the rate of diffusion δ2. We keep δ2
constant over time and project outcomes, to avoid identification issues.16
To estimate equation (10), we compute the observed citation frequency as the
ratio between C(t, T, τ), the number of citations received by patents of outcome τ
and granted in year t from patents granted in year T , and the potential number
of citations, i.e., the number of citations which would have been observed if all
patents granted in year T had cited all patents granted in year t with outcome τ :
p(t, T, τ) =
C(t, T, τ)
N(t, τ)N(T )
,
15Higher δ1 corresponds to faster obsolescence, i.e., the citation function is shifted to the left
for higher values of δ1.
16Increases in δ2, holding δ1 constant, increases the overall citation intensity, i.e., they are very
close to increases in δ0. As a result, models in which both δ0 and δ2 vary as a function of the
same set of characteristics are not identified. Convergence problems also forbid the inclusion of
all cited-year effects. We follow the literature and solve the problem by introducing cited-year
effects defined on the basis of 5-year time periods (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996).
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where N(T ) is the number of (citing) patents granted in year T , and N(t, τ) the
number of (cited) patents granted in year t and with outcome τ . For estimation,
we use nonlinear least squares and weight each observation by [N(t, τ)N(T )]1/2.
3.3 Results
The results from the double-exponential analysis are shown in Figure 1 and Table
1. Note that the regression results are obtained by comparing the citation patterns
of informed patents (success or failure) against the benchmark (those patents with
no information about preclinical or clinical development).17 In Figure 1, we plot
the estimated citation lag distributions of different groups of patents, including
those without known results. We distinguish self-citations from citations by other
organizations. The horizontal axis is the citation lag, i.e., the difference in granting
years between citing and cited patents (T − t), and the vertical axis is citation
intensity. We use results from Model 2 in Table 1 to draw the fitted lines in Figure
1. The vertical line at the lag of eight years (after the cited patent is granted)
indicates the average project duration (from patent application to achievement of
project outcome) in our data.18
Our hypothesis predicts that successful patents receive more citations than
failed ones, which in turn have a higher number of forward citations than patents
with no results. In Table 1, the estimates of overall likelihoods of forward citations
for failed patents (δf0 ) and successful patents (δ
s
0) are both greater than one when
citations by other organizations are taken into account, whereas in the case of self-
citations we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the failed and successful patents
have an average citation intensity that is equal to the one of the uninformative
patents. This means that failed and successful patents are more likely to be cited
17We stress here that our analysis was undertaken by comparing the three groups of patents
in terms of numbers of citations. A known source of noise in citation studies comes from the fact
that citations in the final patent document are not only those declared by the inventors, but also
added by the examiner. Recent literature shows that analysis based on pooled sets of citations
may suffer from bias (Alca´cer and Gittelman, 2006). As long as the number of citations added
by the examiner is unrelated to the outcome of the associated R&D project (which is unknown
when the patent is granted), our relative comparison is unaffected by the examiner-citation issue.
18The average length is 7.8 years for failed projects and 8.3 years for successful ones. These
figures are consistent with previous studies on the duration of the drug development process
(Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004).
13
Figure 1: Estimated citation lag distribution function, citations by others and
self-citations
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by other organizations than the reference group, i.e., those without any project
information. In Model 2, we can also reject the null hypothesis that δs0 equals
δ
f
0 at the 5% level, meaning that in the case of citations by other organizations,
our hypothesis is supported by our data. On the contrary, this is no longer true
when self-citations are taken into account. This result is also illustrated in Figure
1, where the fitted line for failed patents lies between the fitted lines for two
other groups of patents. Previous literature emphasizes a positive correlation
between the value of a patent and the number of forward citations it receives
(Trajtenberg, 1994, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999, Harhoff et al., 1999, Jaffe
et al., 2000, Trajtenberg et al., 1997, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002, Gambardella
et al., 2008). From this point of view, our result thus suggests that there is a
value attached to a failed patent that spills over firm boundaries. Although the
compound associated with the patent will never reach the market (e.g., due to
the emergence of toxicological problems or lack of effectiveness), the open research
approach and related information is subsequently exploited by other inventors.
The double-exponential model allows us to examine the dynamics of the knowl-
edge diffusion process further. When citations by other organizations are consid-
ered, failed patents have an earlier “peak” of forward citations (i.e., modal lag)
than successful ones.19 Another interesting feature is that the citation patterns for
successful and failed patents differ significantly only five years after patent grant.
For the first five years, there is no significant difference between the two trends.
Comparison of the estimates of δ1 (rate of obsolescence) reveals a difference be-
tween successful and failed patents in terms of citations by other organizations,
whereas the difference fades away when self-citations are considered. In this as-
pect, when citations by other organizations are considered, failed patents share
very similar dynamics as with patents with no results. The value of δf1 is very
19Our results are consistent with the estimates of the Drugs and Medical sector in Hall et al.
(2001), except that we obtain a lower value of δ2, the rate of knowledge diffusion. However, com-
parison is made difficult by the fact that we separately analyze citations by other organizations
and self-citations. This limitation notwithstanding, note that Hall et al. (2001) report a citation
lag distribution in the Drugs and Medical sector that is flatter than in other sectors such as
Computers and Communications, Electrical and Electronics, Chemical, and Mechanical sectors,
where higher peak tends to come earlier in time. In other words, knowledge in the Drugs and
Medical sector diffuses less rapidly and takes longer to become obsolete. Important information
about protected compounds, such as toxicological effects and effectiveness, is revealed over time,
and leads to a lengthier process to generate citations.
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Citations by others Self-citations
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
δ
f
0 1.264* 1.329* 1.194* 1.121*
(0.182) (0.111) (0.197) (0.173)
[1.451] [2.964] [0.985] [0.699]
δs0 1.309* 1.511* 0.926* 0.903*
(0.158) (0.108) (0.141) (0.127)
[1.956] [4.731] [-0.525] [-0.764]
δ1 0.107* 0.084* 0.323* 0.300*
(0.008) (0.013) (0.027) (0.037)
δ
f
1 0.827* 1.049* 0.710* 0.653*
(0.135) (0.108) (0.086) (0.087)
[-1.281] [0.454] [-3.372] [-3.989]
δs1 0.554* 0.604* 0.491* 0.413*
(0.087) (0.077) (0.060) (0.066)
[-5.126] [-5.143] [-8.483] [-8.894]
δ2 0.114* 0.248* 0.094* 0.197*
(0.014) (0.042) (0.013) (0.061)
Cited year effects no yes no yes
Citing year effects no yes no yes
R-squared 0.686 0.858 0.609 0.641
Dependent variable: citation intensity
Standard errors in parenthesis.
In square brackets: t-stat. for H0: parameter = 1 (if relevant)
* statistically significant at 5% level.
Table 1: Results of estimation of double-exponential function
close to one, which implies no significant difference between the rates of obsoles-
cence in the two groups. On the contrary, the value of δs1 is significantly lower than
one, i.e., the knowledge embedded in patents protecting marketed compounds be-
comes obsolete less quickly than knowledge in other groups. Indeed, the citation
intensity of marketed compounds is quite stable after marketing, whereas the ci-
tation intensity of failed patents decreases substantially. When self-citations are
considered, both δs1 and δ
f
1 are lower than 1, pointing to smaller obsolescence rates
of failed and successful patents with respect to the uninformative ones.
We now dig further into the citation patterns of successful and failed com-
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pounds after the outcome is known. Figure 2 and Figure 3 compare the average
number of citations received by failed and successful patents with the control group
of inconclusive patents before and after the outcome of the project is disclosed (i.e.
either the compound is marketed or termination of the trial is announced). First,
we compute the ratio of the citations received by s- and f -patents to the average
number of citation in the control group (n) each year after the publication.20 Then,
the ratio are arranged around the time when the outcome of the project becomes
known: time 0 is the time of market launch for successful drugs or the time of
announcement of discontinuation for failed projects. We distinguish citations by
others (Figure 2) from self-citations (Figure 3).
Figure 2 shows that 5 years before the outcome is known the number of ci-
tations to failed and successful patents is about twice the number of citations to
patents without information about clinical trials. Few years before the outcome,
the two series start to diverge. On the one side, successful compounds pass phase
III of clinical trials and enter the registration status, so people get to know that
the product will be launched soon. Conversely, early evidence of problems in clin-
ical trials (e.g., side effects, lack of effectiveness, toxicity) is likely to emerge for
those compounds that are deemed to fail. For failed patents, once the outcome is
announced, the number of citations slowly converges to the number of citations
of non-informative compounds. However, citations to failed patents are signifi-
cantly higher than citations to the uninformative ones even several years after the
clinical trial outcome is known. The gap between citations received by failed and
uninformative patents quantifies the informative contribution of failed drug to the
innovation process in pharmaceuticals.
Figure 3 depicts a similar pattern for self-citations. However, the converge of
the failed patents curve to the uninformative benchmark is faster. Since the likely
outcome of the clinical trial is known to the sponsoring organization well before
the public announcement, self-citations can anticipate citations by others.
All in all, we show that failures play an important role in pharmaceutical
research, especially for unmet medical needs in which no effective treatment has
been developed yet. Patents covering drug candidates that failed to pass clinical
trials obtain a larger number of citations by other innovators than patents without
20Ratios are computed grouping patents based on publication year.
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Figure 2: Relative number of citations by others for failed (red line) and successful
patents (blue line) as compared to the uninformative ones (reference line equal
to 1) before and after the project outcome is disclosed (time 0), in years. 95%
confidence interval are also reported.
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Figure 3: Relative number of self-citations by others for failed (red line) and
successful patents (blue line) as compared to the uninformative ones (reference
line equal to 1) before and after the project outcome is disclosed (time 0), in
years. 95% confidence interval are also reported.
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clinical evidence. In pharmaceutical R&D, researchers tend to cumulate on failed
drug development attempts over a long time span.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present empirical evidence of the contribution of failure vis-a´-vis
success to the pharmaceutical innovation process. We also suggested a theoretical
framework to capture the learning mechanism. Overall, the prediction generated
by the theory are consistent with the empirical results. In other words, failures as
well as successes contain valuable lessons for future endeavor.
In light of this finding, an important policy question is whether an inventor
should be rewarded for failures, or negative results; and if so, how to construct a
proper incentive mechanism, which may be highly sensitive to the technological
and organizational features of the prevailing context. In the world of innova-
tion, for instance, for firms in our dataset, patent policy, such as infringement
issues, determines whether they can reap some reward from their failure. And in
other fields, inventors may not be able to secure a patent based on their failures
in the first place. To the extent that this knowledge should also be rewarded,
this problem may be somewhat mitigated (for academic players at least) by the
introduction of (peer-reviewed) journals of negative results, such as Journal Neg-
ative Results - Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Journal of Negative Results in
Biomedicine, Journal of Pharmaceutical Negative Results. But whether this is suf-
ficient, and more generally, how to reward failure in other contexts, such as in a
profit-maximizing firm, remain an interesting topic to be tackled.
Our work also contributes to the ongoing debate on the disclosure of clinical tri-
als information. Traditionally, data collected by pharmaceutical companies while
conducting clinical trials have been considered confidential and legally designated
as trade secret. However, the situation with regard to clinical trial disclosure is
changing at a fast pace. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration
Amendment Act (FDAA) of 2007 requires that results of completed clinical trials
of FDA-approved or cleared drugs to be electronically available in a public reg-
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ister.21 Unsuccessful trials were not covered by the result disclosure policy even
if an extension of FDAAA to cover failed clinical trials is currently under discus-
sion (Zarin et al., 2011). Our findings on the information value of failed clinical
trials provide support to the extension of the results disclosure policy to include
unapproved drugs.
Another line for future study is to extend and enrich the analysis in this paper.
To focus on learning, we left out some important concerns in our model. Among
others, we disregarded strategic behavior in our theoretical treatment It would be
interesting to investigate how strategic concerns (both in market competition and
R&D competition) affect a firm’s decisions to exploit others’ as well as its own
successes and failures, and how these factors distort the value of failure in the
innovation process for small and big research organizations.
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